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Abstract
Many machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial attacks; for example, adding
adversarial perturbations that are imperceptible to humans can often make machine learning
models produce wrong predictions with high confidence. Moreover, although we may obtain
robust models on the training dataset via adversarial training, in some problems the learned
models cannot generalize well to the test data. In this paper, we focus on `∞ attacks, and
study the adversarially robust generalization problem through the lens of Rademacher com-
plexity. For binary linear classifiers, we prove tight bounds for the adversarial Rademacher
complexity, and show that the adversarial Rademacher complexity is never smaller than its
natural counterpart, and it has an unavoidable dimension dependence, unless the weight vector
has bounded `1 norm. The results also extend to multi-class linear classifiers. For (nonlin-
ear) neural networks, we show that the dimension dependence in the adversarial Rademacher
complexity also exists. We further consider a surrogate adversarial loss for one-hidden layer
ReLU network and prove margin bounds for this setting. Our results indicate that having `1
norm constraints on the weight matrices might be a potential way to improve generalization
in the adversarial setting. We demonstrate experimental results that validate our theoretical
findings.
1 Introduction
In recent years, many modern machine learning models, in particular, deep neural networks, have
achieved success in tasks such as image classification [27], speech recognition [25], machine trans-
lation [6], game playing [48], etc. However, although these models achieve the state-of-the-art
performance in many standard benchmarks or competitions, it has been observed that by adver-
sarially adding some perturbation to the input of the model (images, audio signals), the machine
learning models can make wrong predictions with high confidence. These adversarial inputs are
often called the adversarial examples. Typical methods of generating adversarial examples include
adding small perturbations that are imperceptible to humans [51], changing surrounding areas of
the main objects in images [21], and even simple rotation and translation [17]. This phenomenon
was first discovered by Szegedy et al. [51] in image classification problems, and similar phenomena
have been observed in other areas [14, 32]. Adversarial examples bring serious challenges in many
security-critical applications, such as medical diagnosis and autonomous driving—the existence of
these examples shows that many state-of-the-art machine learning models are actually unreliable
in the presence of adversarial attacks.
Since the discovery of adversarial examples, there has been a race between designing robust
models that can defend against adversarial attacks and designing attack algorithms that can gen-
erate adversarial examples and fool the machine learning models [24, 26, 12, 13]. As of now, it
seems that the attackers are winning this game. For example, a recent work shows that many of
the defense algorithms fail when the attacker uses a carefully designed gradient-based method [4].
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Meanwhile, adversarial training [28, 47, 37] seems to be the most effective defense method. Ad-
versarial training takes a robust optimization [10] perspective to the problem, and the basic idea
is to minimize some adversarial loss over the training data. We elaborate below.
Suppose that data points (x, y) are drawn according to some unknown distribution D over the
feature-label space X×Y, and X ⊆ Rd. Let F be a hypothesis class (e.g., a class of neural networks
with a particular architecture), and `(f(x), y) be the loss associated with f ∈ F . Consider the `∞
white-box adversarial attack where an adversary is allowed to observe the trained model and choose
some x′ such that ‖x′−x‖∞ ≤  and `(f(x′), y) is maximized. Therefore, to better defend against
adversarial attacks, during training, the learner should aim to solve the empirical adversarial risk
minimization problem
min
f∈F
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
‖x′i−xi‖∞≤
`(f(x′i), yi), (1)
where {(xi, yi)}ni=1 are n i.i.d. training examples drawn according to D. This minimax formulation
raises many interesting theoretical and practical questions. For example, we need to understand
how to efficiently solve the optimization problem in (1), and in addition, we need to characterize
the generalization property of the adversarial risk, i.e., the gap between the empirical adversarial
risk in (1) and the population adversarial risk E(x,y)∼D[max‖x′−x‖∞≤ `(f(x′), y)]. In fact, for deep
neural networks, both questions are still wide open. In particular, for the generalization problem,
it has been observed that even if we can minimize the adversarial training error, the adversarial
test error can still be large. For example, for a Resnet [27] model on CIFAR10, using the PGD
adversarial training algorithm by Madry et al. [37], one can achieve about 96% adversarial training
accuracy, but the adversarial test accuracy is only 47%. This generalization gap is significantly
larger than that in the natural setting (without adversarial attacks), and thus it has become
increasingly important to better understand the generalization behavior of machine learning models
in the adversarial setting.
In this paper, we focus on the adversarially robust generalization property and make a first step
towards deeper understanding of this problem. We focus on `∞ adversarial attacks and analyze
generalization through the lens of Rademacher complexity. We study both linear classifiers and
nonlinear feedforward neural networks, and both binary and multi-class classification problems.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
1.1 Our Contributions
• For binary linear classifiers, we prove tight upper and lower bounds for the adversarial Rademacher
complexity. We show that the adversarial Rademacher complexity is never smaller than its coun-
terpart in the natural setting, which provides theoretical evidence for the empirical observation
that adversarially robust generalization can be hard. We also show that under an `∞ adversarial
attack, when the weight vector of the linear classifier has bounded `p norm (p ≥ 1), a polynomial
dimension dependence in the adversarial Rademacher complexity is unavoidable, unless p = 1.
For multi-class linear classifiers, we prove margin bounds in the adversarial setting. Similar to
binary classifiers, the margin bound also exhibits polynomial dimension dependence when the
weight vector for each class has bounded `p norm (p > 1).
• For neural networks, we show that in contrast to the margin bounds derived by Bartlett et al.
[9] and Golowich et al. [23] which depend only on the norms of the weight matrices and the data
points, the adversarial Rademacher complexity has a lower bound with an explicit dimension
dependence, which is also an effect of the `∞ attack. We further consider a surrogate adversarial
loss for one hidden layer ReLU networks, based on the SDP relaxation proposed by Raghunathan
et al. [44]. We prove margin bounds using the surrogate loss and show that if the weight matrix
of the first layer has bounded `1 norm, the margin bound does not have explicit dimension
dependence. This suggests that in the adversarial setting, controlling the `1 norms of the weight
matrices may be a way to improve generalization.
• We conduct experiments on linear classifiers and neural networks to validate our theoretical find-
ings; more specifically, our experiments show that `1 regularization could reduce the adversarial
generalization error, and the adversarial generalization gap increases as the dimension of the
feature spaces increases.
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1.2 Notation
We define the set [N ] := {1, 2, . . . , N}. For two sets A and B, we denote by BA the set of all
functions from A to B. We denote the indicator function of a event A as 1(A). Unless otherwise
stated, we denote vectors by boldface lowercase letters such asw, and the elements in the vector are
denoted by italics letters with subscripts, such as wk. All-one vectors are denoted by 1. Matrices
are denoted by boldface uppercase letters such as W. For a matrix W ∈ Rd×m with columns wi,
i ∈ [m], the (p, q) matrix norm of W is defined as ‖W‖p,q = ‖[‖w1‖p, ‖w2‖p, · · · , ‖wm‖p]‖q, and
we may use the shorthand notation ‖ · ‖p ≡ ‖ · ‖p,p. We denote the spectral norm of matrices by
‖ · ‖σ and the Frobenius norm of matrices by ‖ · ‖F (i.e., ‖ · ‖F ≡ ‖ · ‖2). We use B∞x () to denote
the `∞ ball centered at x ∈ Rd with radius , i.e., B∞x () = {x′ ∈ Rd : ‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ }.
1.3 Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we discuss related work; in Section 3,
we describe the formal problem setup; we present our main results for linear classifiers and neural
networks in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. We demonstrate our experimental results in Section 6
and make conclusions in Section 7.
2 Related Work
During the preparation of the initial draft of this paper, we become aware of another independent
and concurrent work by Khim and Loh [29], which studies a similar problem. In this section, we
first compare our work with Khim and Loh [29] and then discuss other related work. We make the
comparison in the following aspects.
• For binary classification problems, the adversarial Rademacher complexity upper bound by Khim
and Loh [29] is similar to ours. However, we provide an adversarial Rademacher complexity lower
bound that matches the upper bound. Our lower bound shows that the adversarial Rademacher
complexity is never smaller than that in the natural setting, indicating the hardness of ad-
versarially robust generalization. As mentioned, although our lower bound is for Rademacher
complexity rather than generalization, Rademacher complexity is a tight bound for the rate of
uniform convergence of a loss function class [30] and thus in many settings can be a tight bound
for generalization. In addition, we provide a lower bound for the adversarial Rademacher com-
plexity for neural networks. These lower bounds do not appear in the work by Khim and Loh
[29].
• We discuss the generalization bounds for the multi-class setting, whereas Khim and Loh [29]
focus only on binary classification.
• Both our work and Khim and Loh [29] prove adversarial generalization bound using surrogate
adversarial loss (upper bound for the actual adversarial loss). Khim and Loh [29] use a method
called tree transform whereas we use the SDP relaxation proposed by [44]. These two approaches
are based on different ideas and thus we believe that they are not directly comparable.
We proceed to discuss other related work.
Adversarially robust generalization As discussed in Section 1, it has been observed by Madry
et al. [37] that there might be a significant generalization gap when training deep neural networks in
the adversarial setting. This generalization problem has been further studied by Schmidt et al. [46],
who show that to correctly classify two separated d-dimensional spherical Gaussian distributions,
in the natural setting one only needs O(1) training data, but in the adversarial setting one needs
Θ(
√
d) data. Getting distribution agnostic generalization bounds (also known as the PAC-learning
framework) for the adversarial setting is proposed as an open problem by Schmidt et al. [46]. In a
subsequent work, Cullina et al. [15] study PAC-learning guarantees for binary linear classifiers in
the adversarial setting via VC-dimension, and show that the VC-dimension does not increase in
the adversarial setting. This result does not provide explanation to the empirical observation that
adversarially robust generalization may be hard. In fact, although VC-dimension and Rademacher
complexity can both provide valid generalization bounds, VC-dimension usually depends on the
number of parameters in the model while Rademacher complexity usually depends on the norms
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of the weight matrices and data points, and can often provide tighter generalization bounds [7].
Suggala et al. [50] discuss a similar notion of adversarial risk but do not prove explicit generalization
bounds. Attias et al. [5] prove adversarial generalization bounds in a setting where the number
of potential adversarial perturbations is finite, which is a weaker notion than the `∞ attack that
we consider. Sinha et al. [49] analyze the convergence and generalization of an adversarial training
algorithm under the notion of distributional robustness. Farnia et al. [18] study the generalization
problem when the attack algorithm of the adversary is provided to the learner, which is also a
weaker notion than our problem. In earlier work, robust optimization has been studied in Lasso [56]
and SVM [57] problems. Xu and Mannor [55] make the connection between algorithmic robustness
and generalization property in the natural setting, whereas our work focus on generalization in the
adversarial setting.
Provable defense against adversarial attacks Besides generalization property, another re-
cent line of work aim to design provable defense against adversarial attacks. Two examples of
provable defense are SDP relaxation [44, 45] and LP relaxation [31, 54]. The idea of these methods
is to construct upper bounds of the adversarial risk that can be efficiently evaluated and opti-
mized. The analyses of these algorithms usually focus on minimizing training error and do not
have generalization guarantee; in contrast, we focus on generalization property in this paper.
Other theoretical analysis of adversarial examples A few other lines of work have con-
ducted theoretical analysis of adversarial examples. Wang et al. [53] analyze the adversarial ro-
bustness of nearest neighbors estimator. Papernot et al. [43] try to demonstrate the unavoidable
trade-offs between accuracy in the natural setting and the resilience to adversarial attacks, and
this trade-off is further studied by Tsipras et al. [52] through some constructive examples of dis-
tributions. Fawzi et al. [19] analyze adversarial robustness of fixed classifiers, in contrast to our
generalization analysis. Fawzi et al. [20] construct examples of distributions with large latent vari-
able space such that adversarially robust classifiers do not exist; here we argue that these examples
may not explain the fact that adversarially perturbed images can usually be recognized by hu-
mans. Bubeck et al. [11] try to explain the hardness of learning an adversarially robust model
from the computational constraints under the statistical query model. Another recent line of work
explains the existence of adversarial examples via high dimensional geometry and concentration of
measure [22, 16, 38]. These works provide examples where adversarial examples provably exist as
long as the test error of a classifier is non-zero.
Generalization of neural networks Generalization of neural networks has been an important
topic, even in the natural setting where there is no adversary. The key challenge is to understand
why deep neural networks can generalize to unseen data despite the high capacity of the model class.
The problem has received attention since the early stage of neural network study [7, 2]. Recently,
understanding generalization of deep nets is raised as an open problem since traditional techniques
such as VC-dimension, Rademacher complexity, and algorithmic stability are observed to produce
vacuous generalization bounds [58]. Progress has been made more recently. In particular, it has
been shown that when properly normalized by the margin, using Rademacher complexity or PAC-
Bayesian analysis, one can obtain generalization bounds that tend to match the experimental
results [9, 42, 3, 23]. In addition, in this paper, we show that when the weight vectors or matrices
have bounded `1 norm, there is no dimension dependence in the adversarial generalization bound.
This result is consistent and related to several previous works [36, 7, 40, 59].
3 Problem Setup
We start with the general statistical learning framework. Let X and Y be the feature and label
spaces, respectively, and suppose that there is an unknown distribution D over X × Y. In this
paper, we assume that the feature space is a subset of the d dimensional Euclidean space, i.e.,
X ⊆ Rd. Let F ⊆ VX be the hypothesis class that we use to make predictions, where V is
another space that might be different from Y. Let ` : V × Y → [0, B] be the loss function.
Throughout this paper we assume that ` is bounded, i.e., B is a positive constant. In addition,
we introduce the function class `F ⊆ [0, B]X×Y by composing the functions in F with `(·, y), i.e.,
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`F := {(x, y) 7→ `(f(x), y) : f ∈ F}. The goal of the learning problem is to find f ∈ F such that
the population risk R(f) := E(x,y)∈D[`(f(x), y)] is minimized.
We consider the supervised learning setting where one has access to n i.i.d. training exam-
ples drawn according to D, denoted by (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn). A learning algorithm maps
the n training examples to a hypothesis f ∈ F . In this paper, we are interested in the gap be-
tween the empirical risk Rn(f) := 1n
∑n
i=1 `(f(xi), yi) and the population risk R(f), known as the
generalization error.
Rademacher complexity [8] is one of the classic measures of generalization error. Here, we
present its formal definition. For any function class H ⊆ RZ , given a sample S = {z1, z2, . . . , zn}
of size n, and empirical Rademacher complexity is defined as
RS(H) := 1
n
Eσ
[
sup
h∈H
n∑
i=1
σih(zi)
]
,
where σ1, . . . , σn are i.i.d. Rademacher random variables with P{σi = 1} = P{σi = −1} = 12 . In our
learning problem, denote the training sample by S, i.e., S := {(x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xn, yn)}. We
then have the following theorem which connects the population and empirical risks via Rademacher
complexity.
Theorem 1. [8, 41] Suppose that the range of `(f(x), y) is [0, B]. Then, for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with
probability at least 1− δ, the following holds for all f ∈ F ,
R(f) ≤ Rn(f) + 2BRS(`F ) + 3B
√
log 2δ
2n
.
As we can see, Rademacher complexity measures the rate that the empirical risk converges
to the population risk uniformly across F . In fact, according to the anti-symmetrization lower
bound by Koltchinskii et al. [30], one can show that RS(`F ) . supf∈F R(f) − Rn(f) . RS(`F ).
Therefore, Rademacher complexity is a tight bound for the rate of uniform convergence of a loss
function class, and in many settings can be a tight bound for generalization error.
The above discussions can be extended to the adversarial setting. In this paper, we focus
on the `∞ adversarial attack. In this setting, the learning algorithm still has access to n i.i.d.
uncorrupted training examples drawn according to D. Once the learning procedure finishes, the
output hypothesis f is revealed to an adversary. For any data point (x, y) drawn according to D,
the adversary is allowed to perturb x within some `∞ ball to maximize the loss. Our goal is to
minimize the adversarial population risk, i.e.,
R˜(f) := E(x,y)∼D
[
max
x′∈B∞x ()
`(f(x′), y)
]
,
and to this end, a natural way is to conduct adversarial training—minimizing the adversarial
empirical risk
R˜n(f) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B∞xi ()
`(f(x′i), yi).
Let us define the adversarial loss ˜`(f(x), y) := maxB∞x () `(f(x′), y) and the function class ˜`F ⊆
[0, B]X×Y as ˜`F := {˜`(f(x), y) : f ∈ F}. Since the range of ˜`(f(x), y) is still [0, B], we have the
following direct corollary of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1. For any δ ∈ (0, 1), with probability at least 1− δ, the following holds for all f ∈ F ,
R˜(f) ≤ R˜n(f) + 2BRS(˜`F ) + 3B
√
log 2δ
2n
.
As we can see, the Rademacher complexity of the adversarial loss function class ˜`F , i.e., RS(˜`F )
is again the key quantity for the generalization ability of the learning problem. A natural problem
of interest is to compare the Rademacher complexities in the natural and the adversarial settings,
and obtain generalization bounds for the adversarial loss.
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4 Linear Classifiers
4.1 Binary Classification
We start with binary linear classifiers. In this setting, we define Y = {−1,+1}, and let the
hypothesis class F ⊆ RX be a set of linear functions of x ∈ X . More specifically, we define
fw(x) := 〈w,x〉, and consider prediction vector w with `p norm constraint (p ≥ 1), i.e.,
F = {fw(x) : ‖w‖p ≤W}. (2)
We predict the label with the sign of fw(x); more specifically, we assume that the loss function
`(fw(x), y) can be written as `(fw(x), y) ≡ φ(y〈w,x〉), where φ : R → [0, B] is monotonically
nonincreasing and Lφ-Lipschitz. In fact, if φ(0) ≥ 1, we can obtain a bound on the classification
error according to Theorem 1. That is, with probability at least 1− δ, for all fw ∈ F ,
P(x,y)∼D{sgn(fw(x)) 6= y} ≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
`(fw(xi), yi) + 2BRS(`F ) + 3B
√
log 2δ
2n
.
In addition, recall that according to the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality [35], we have
RS(`F ) ≤ LφRS(F).
For the adversarial setting, we have˜`(fw(x), y) = max
x′∈B∞x ()
`(fw(x
′), y)=φ( min
x′∈B∞x ()
y〈w,x′〉).
Let us define the following function class F˜ ⊆ RX×{±1}:
F˜ =
{
min
x′∈B∞x ()
y〈w,x′〉 : ‖w‖p ≤W
}
. (3)
Again, we have RS(˜`F ) ≤ LφRS(F˜). The first major contribution of our work is the following
theorem, which provides a comparison between RS(F) and RS(F˜).
Theorem 2 (Main Result 1). Let F := {fw(x) : ‖w‖p ≤ W} and F˜ := {minx′∈B∞x () y〈w,x′〉 :
‖w‖p ≤W}. Suppose that 1p + 1q = 1. Then, there exists a universal constant c ∈ (0, 1) such that
max{RS(F), cW d
1
q√
n
} ≤ RS(F˜) ≤ RS(F) + W d
1
q√
n
.
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix A. We can see that the adversarial Rademacher complexity,
i.e., RS(F˜) is always at least as large as the Rademacher complexity in the natural setting. This
implies that uniform convergence in the adversarial setting is at least as hard as that in the natural
setting. In addition, since max{a, b} ≥ 12 (a+ b), we have
c
2
(
RS(F) + W d
1
q√
n
)
≤ RS(F˜) ≤ RS(F) + W d
1
q√
n
.
Therefore, we have a tight bound for RS(F˜) up to a constant factor. Further, if p > 1 the
adversarial Rademacher complexity has an unavoidable polynomial dimension dependence, i.e.,
RS(F˜) is always at least as large as O(W d1/q√n ). On the other hand, one can easily show that
in the natural setting, RS(F) = Wn Eσ[‖
∑n
i=1 σixi‖q], which implies that RS(F) depends on the
distribution of xi and the norm constraintW , but does not have an explicit dimension dependence.
This means that RS(F˜) could be order-wise larger than RS(F), depending on the distribution of
the data. An interesting fact is that, if we have an `1 norm constraint on the prediction vector w,
we can avoid the dimension dependence in RS(F˜).
4.2 Multi-class Classification
4.2.1 Margin Bounds for Multi-class Classification
We proceed to study multi-class linear classifiers. We start with the standard margin bound
framework for multi-class classification. In K-class classification problems, we choose Y = [K],
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and the functions in the hypothesis class F map X to RK , i.e., F ⊆ (RK)X . Intuitively, the k-th
coordinate of f(x) is the score that f gives to the k-th class, and we make prediction by choosing
the class with the highest score. We define the margin operator M(z, y) : RK × [K] → R as
M(z, y) = zy−maxy′ 6=y zy′ . For a training example (x, y), a hypothesis f makes a correct prediction
if and only if M(f(x), y) > 0. We also define function class MF := {(x, y) 7→ M(f(x), y) : f ∈
F} ⊆ RX×[K]. For multi-class classification problems, we consider a particular loss function
`(f(x), y) = φγ(M(f(x), y)), where γ > 0 and φγ : R→ [0, 1] is the ramp loss:
φγ(t) =

1 t ≤ 0
1− tγ 0 < t < γ
0 t ≥ γ.
(4)
One can check that `(f(x), y) satisfies:
1(y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[f(x)]y′) ≤ `(f(x), y) ≤ 1([f(x)]y ≤ γ + max
y′ 6=y
[f(x)]y′). (5)
Let S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 ∈ (X × [K])n be the i.i.d. training examples, and define the function class
`F := {(x, y) 7→ φγ(M(f(x), y)) : f ∈ F} ⊆ RX×[K]. Since φγ(t) ∈ [0, 1] and φγ(·) is 1/γ-Lipschitz,
by combining (5) with Theorem 1, we can obtain the following direct corollary as the generalization
bound in the multi-class setting [41].
Corollary 2. Consider the above multi-class classification setting. For any fixed γ > 0, we have
with probability at least 1− δ, for all f ∈ F ,
P(x,y)∼D
{
y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[f(x)]y′
}
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1([f(xi)]yi ≤ γ + max
y′ 6=y
[f(xi)]y′) + 2RS(`F ) + 3
√
log 2δ
2n
.
In the adversarial setting, the adversary tries to maximize the loss `(f(x), y) = φγ(M(f(x), y))
around an `∞ ball centered at x. We have the adversarial loss ˜`(f(x), y) := maxx′∈B∞x () `(f(x′), y),
and the function class ˜`F := {(x, y) 7→ ˜`(f(x), y) : f ∈ F} ⊆ RX×[K]. Thus, we have the following
generalization bound in the adversarial setting.
Corollary 3. Consider the above adversarial multi-class classification setting. For any fixed γ > 0,
we have with probability at least 1− δ, for all f ∈ F ,
P(x,y)∼D
{
∃ x′ ∈ B∞x () s.t. y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[f(x′)]y′
}
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1(∃ x′i ∈ B∞xi() s.t. [f(x′i)]yi ≤ γ + maxy′ 6=y[f(x
′
i)]y′) + 2RS(˜`F ) + 3
√
log 2δ
2n
.
4.2.2 Multi-class Linear Classifiers
We now focus on multi-class linear classifiers. For linear classifiers, each function in the hypothesis
class is linearly parametrized by a matrix W ∈ RK×d, i.e., f(x) ≡ fW(x) = Wx. Let wk ∈ Rd be
the k-th column of W>, then we have [fW(x)]k = 〈wk,x〉. We assume that each wk has `p norm
(p ≥ 1) upper bounded by W , which implies that F = {fW(x) : ‖W>‖p,∞ ≤ W}. In the natural
setting, we have the following margin bound for linear classifiers as a corollary of the multi-class
margin bounds by Kuznetsov et al. [33], Maximov and Reshetova [39].
Theorem 3. Consider the multi-class linear classifiers in the above setting, and suppose that
1
p +
1
q = 1, p, q ≥ 1. For any fixed γ > 0 and W > 0, we have with probability at least 1 − δ, for
all W such that ‖W>‖p,∞ ≤W ,
P(x,y)∼D
{
y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
〈wy′ ,x〉
}
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1(〈wyi ,xi〉 ≤ γ + max
y′ 6=yi
〈wy′ ,xi〉)
+
4KW
γn
Eσ
[
‖
n∑
i=1
σixi‖q
]
+ 3
√
log 2δ
2n
.
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We prove Theorem 3 in Appendix B.1 for completeness. In the adversarial setting, we have the
following margin bound.
Theorem 4 (Main Result 2). Consider the multi-class linear classifiers in the adversarial set-
ting, and suppose that 1p +
1
q = 1, p, q ≥ 1. For any fixed γ > 0 and W > 0, we have with probability
at least 1− δ, for all W such that ‖W>‖p,∞ ≤W ,
P(x,y)∼D
{
∃ x′ ∈ B∞x () s.t. y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
〈wy′ ,x〉
}
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1(〈wyi ,xi〉 ≤ γ + max
y′ 6=yi
(〈wy′ ,xi〉+ ‖wy′ −wyi‖1))
+
2WK
γ
[

√
Kd
1
q√
n
+
1
n
K∑
y=1
Eσ
[
‖
n∑
i=1
σixi1(yi = y)‖q
]]
+ 3
√
log 2δ
2n
.
We prove Theorem 4 in Appendix B.2. As we can see, similar to the binary classification prob-
lems, if p > 1, the margin bound in the adversarial setting has an explicit polynomial dependence
on d, whereas in the natural setting, the margin bound does not have dimension dependence. This
shows that, at least for the generalization upper bound that we obtain, the dimension dependence
in the adversarial setting also exists in the multi-class classification problems.
5 Neural Networks
We proceed to consider feedforward neural networks with ReLU activation. Here, each function
f in the hypothesis class F is parametrized by a sequence of matrices W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WL),
i.e., f ≡ fW. Assume that Wh ∈ Rdh×dh−1 , and ρ(·) be the ReLU function, i.e., ρ(t) = max{t, 0}
for t ∈ R. For vectors, ρ(x) is vector generated by applying ρ(·) on each coordinate of x, i.e.,
[ρ(x)]i = ρ(xi). We have1
fW(x) = WLρ(WL−1ρ(· · · ρ(W1x) · · · )).
For K-class classification, we have dL = K, fW(x) : Rd → RK , and [fW(x)]k is the score for the
k-th class. In the special case of binary classification, as discussed in Section 4.1, we can have
Y = {+1,−1}, dL = 1, and the loss function can be written as
`(fW(x), y) = φ(yfW(x)),
where φ : R→ [0, B] is monotonically nonincreasing and Lφ-Lipschitz.
5.1 Comparison of Rademacher Complexity Bounds
We start with a comparison of Rademacher complexities of neural networks in the natural and ad-
versarial settings. Although naively applying the definition of Rademacher complexity may provide
a loose generalization bound [58], when properly normalized by the margin, one can still derive
generalization bound that matches experimental observations via Rademacher complexity [9]. Our
comparison shows that, when the weight matrices of the neural networks have bounded norms, in
the natural setting, the Rademacher complexity is upper bounded by a quantity which only has
logarithmic dependence on the dimension; however, in the adversarial setting, the Rademacher
complexity is lower bounded by a quantity with explicit
√
d dependence.
We focus on the binary classification. For the natural setting, we review the results by Bartlett
et al. [9]. Let S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1 ∈ (X × {−1,+1})n be the i.i.d. training examples, and define
X := [x1,x2, · · · ,xn] ∈ Rd×n, and dmax = max{d, d1, d2, . . . , dL}.
Theorem 5. [9] Consider the neural network hypothesis class
F = {fW(x) : W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WL), ‖Wh‖σ ≤ sh, ‖W>h ‖2,1 ≤ bh, h ∈ [L]} ⊆ RX .
1This implies that d0 ≡ d.
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Then, we have
RS(F) ≤ 4
n3/2
+
26 log(n) log(2dmax)
n
‖X‖F
(
L∏
h=1
sh
) L∑
j=1
(
bj
sj
)2/3
3/2 .
On the other hand, in this work, we prove the following result which shows that when the
product of the spectral norms of all the weight matrices is bounded, the Rademacher complexity
of the adversarial loss function class is lower bounded by a quantity with an explicit
√
d factor.
More specifically, for binary classification problems, since˜`(fW(x), y) = max
x′∈B∞x ()
`(fW(x
′), y) = φ( min
x′∈B∞x ()
yfW(x
′)),
and φ(·) is Lipschitz, we consider the function class
F˜ = {(x, y) 7→ min
x′∈B∞x ()
yfW(x
′) : W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WL),
L∏
h=1
‖Wh‖σ ≤ r} ⊆ RX×{−1,+1}. (6)
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 6 (Main Result 3). Let F˜ be defined as in (6). Then, there exists a universal constant
c > 0 such that
RS(F˜) ≥ cr
(
1
n
‖X‖F + 
√
d
n
)
.
We prove Theorem 6 in Appendix C.1. This result shows that if we aim to study the Rademacher
complexity of the function class defined as in (6), a
√
d dimension dependence may be unavoidable,
in contrast to the natural setting where the dimension dependence is only logarithmic.
5.2 Generalization Bound for Surrogate Adversarial Loss
For neural networks, even if there is only one hidden layer, for a particular data point (x, y),
evaluating the adversarial loss ˜`(fW(x), y) = maxx′∈B∞x () `(fW(x′), y) can be hard, since it requires
maximizing a non-concave function in a bounded set. A recent line of work tries to find upper
bounds for ˜`(fW(x), y) that can be computed in polynomial time. More specifically, we would
like to find surrogate adversarial loss ̂`(fW(x), y) such that ̂`(fW(x), y) ≥ ˜`(fW(x), y), ∀ x, y,W.
These surrogate adversarial loss can thus provide certified defense against adversarial examples,
and can be computed efficiently. In addition, the surrogate adversarial loss ̂`(fW(x), y) should be
as tight as possible—it should be close enough to the original adversarial loss ˜`(fW(x), y), so that
the surrogate adversarial loss can indeed represent the robustness of the model against adversarial
attacks. Recently, a few approaches to designing surrogate adversarial loss have been developed,
and SDP relaxation [44, 45] and LP relaxation [31, 54] are two major examples.
In this section, we focus on the SDP relaxation for one hidden layer neural network with
ReLU activation proposed by Raghunathan et al. [44]. We prove a generalization bound regarding
the surrogate adversarial loss, and show that this generalization bound does not have explicit
dimension dependence if the weight matrix of the first layer has bounded `1 norm. We consider
K-class classification problems in this section (i.e., Y = [K]), and start with the definition and
property of the SDP surrogate loss. Since we only have one hidden layer, fW(x) = W2ρ(W1x).
Let w2,k be the k-th column ofW>2 . Then, we have the following results according to Raghunathan
et al. [44].
Theorem 7. [44] For any (x, y), W1, W2, and y′ 6= y,
max
x′∈B∞x ()
([fW(x
′)]y′ − [fW(x′)]y) ≤ [fW(x)]y′ − [fW(x)]y + 
4
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈Q(w2,y′ −w2,y),P〉,
where Q(v,W) is defined as
Q(v,W) :=
 0 0 1>W> diag(v)0 0 W> diag(v)
diag(v)>W1 diag(v)>W 0
 . (7)
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Since we consider multi-class classification problems in this section, we use the ramp loss φγ
defined in (4) composed with the margin operator as our loss function. Thus, we have `(fW(x), y) =
φγ(M(fW(x), y)) and ˜`(fW(x), y) = maxx′∈B∞x () φγ(M(fW(x′), y)). Here, we design a surrogate
loss ̂`(fW(x), y) based on Theorem 7.
Lemma 1. Define
̂`(fW(x), y) := φγ(M(fW(x), y)− 
2
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
)
.
Then, we have
max
x′∈B∞x ()
1(y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[fW(x
′)]y′) ≤ ̂`(fW(x), y)
≤ 1
(
M(fW(x), y)− 
2
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉 ≤ γ
)
.
We prove Lemma 1 in Appendix C.2. With this surrogate adversarial loss in hand, we can
develop the following margin bound for adversarial generalization. In this theorem, we use X =
[x1,x2, · · · ,xn] ∈ Rd×n, and dmax = max{d, d1,K}.
Theorem 8. Consider the neural network hypothesis class
F = {fW(x) : W = (W1,W2), ‖Wh‖σ ≤ sh, h = 1, 2, ‖W1‖1 ≤ b1, ‖W>2 ‖2,1 ≤ b2}.
Then, for any fixed γ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ, we have for all fW(·) ∈ F ,
P(x,y)∼D
{
∃ x′ ∈ B∞x () s.t. y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[fW(x
′)]y′
}
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1
(
[fW(xi)]yi ≤ γ + max
y′ 6=yi
[fW(xi)]y′ +

2
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
)
+
1
γ
(
4
n3/2
+
60 log(n) log(2dmax)
n
s1s2
(
(
b1
s1
)2/3 + (
b2
s2
)2/3
)3/2
‖X‖F + 2b1b2√
n
)
+ 3
√
log 2δ
2n
.
We prove Theorem 8 in Appendix C.3. Similar to linear classifiers, in the adversarial setting,
if we have an `1 norm constraint on the matrix matrix W1, then the generalization bound of the
surrogate adversarial loss does not have an explicit dimension dependence.
6 Experiments
In this section, we validate our theoretical findings for linear classifiers and neural networks via
experiments. Our experiments are implemented with Tensorflow [1] on the MNIST dataset [34].
6.1 Linear Classifiers
We validate two theoretical findings for linear classifiers: (i) controlling the `1 norm of the model
parameters can reduce the adversarial generalization error, and (ii) there is a dimension dependence
in adversarial generalization, i.e., adversarially robust generalization is harder when the dimension
of the feature space is higher. We train the multi-class linear classifier using the following objective
function:
min
W
1
n
n∑
i=1
max
x′i∈B∞xi ()
`(fW(x
′
i), yi) + λ‖W‖1, (8)
where `(·) is cross entropy loss and fW(x) ≡Wx. Since we focus on the generalization property,
we use a small number of training data so that the generalization gap is more significant. More
specifically, in each run of the training algorithm, we randomly sample n = 1000 data points
from the training set of MNIST as the training data, and run adversarial training to minimize the
objective (8). Our training algorithm alternates between mini-batch stochastic gradient descent
with respect to W and computing adversarial examples on the chosen batch in each iteration.
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Here, we note that since we consider linear classifiers, the adversarial examples can be analytically
computed according to Appendix B.2.
In our first experiment, we vary the values of  and λ, and for each (, λ) pair, we conduct 10
runs of the training algorithm, and in each run we sample the 1000 training data independently.
In Figure 2, we plot the adversarial generalization error as a function of  and λ, and the error bars
show the standard deviation of the 10 runs. As we can see, when λ increases, the generalization
gap decreases, and thus we conclude that `1 regularization is helpful for reducing adversarial
generalization error.
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Figure 1: Linear classifiers. Adversarial generalization error vs `∞ perturbation  and regularization
coefficient λ.
In our second experiment, we choose λ = 0 and study the dependence of adversarial general-
ization error on the dimension of the feature space. Recall that each data point in the original
MNIST dataset is a 28× 28 image, i.e., d = 784. We construct two additional image datasets with
d = 196 (downsampled) and d = 3136 (expanded), respectively. To construct the downsampled
image, we replace each 2 × 2 patch—say, with pixel values a, b, c, d—on the original image with
a single pixel with value
√
a2 + b2 + c2 + d2. To construct the expanded image, we replace each
pixel—say, with value a—on the original image with a 2 × 2 patch, with the value of each pixel
in the patch being a/2. Such construction keeps the `2 norm of the every single image the same
across the three datasets, and thus leads a fair comparison. The adversarial generalization error
is plotted in Figure 2, and as we can see, when the dimension d increases, the generalization gap
also increases.
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Figure 2: Linear classifiers. Adversarial generalization error vs `∞ perturbation  and dimension of
feature space d.
6.2 Neural Networks
In this experiment, we validate our theoretical result that `1 regularization can reduce the ad-
versarial generalization error on a four-layer ReLU neural network, where the first two layers are
convolutional and the last two layers are fully connected. We use PGD attack [37] adversarial
training to minimize the `1 regularized objective (8). We use the whole training set of MNIST,
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and once the model is obtained, we use PGD attack to check the adversarial training and test
error. We present the adversarial generalization errors under the PGD attack in Figure 3. As we
can see, the adversarial generalization error decreases as we increase the regularization coefficient
λ; thus `1 regularization indeed reduces the adversarial generalization error under the PGD attack.
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Figure 3: Neural networks. Adversarial generalization error vs regularization coefficient λ.
7 Conclusions
We study the adversarially robust generalization properties of linear classifiers and neural networks
through the lens of Rademacher complexity. For binary linear classifiers, we prove tight bounds
for the adversarial Rademacher complexity, and show that in the adversarial setting, Rademacher
complexity is never smaller than that in the natural setting, and it has an unavoidable dimension
dependence, unless the weight vector has bounded `1 norm. The results also extends to multi-class
linear classifiers. For neural networks, we prove a lower bound of the Rademacher complexity of
the adversarial loss function class and show that there is also an unavoidable dimension dependence
due to `∞ adversarial attack. We further consider a surrogate adversarial loss and prove margin
bound for this setting. Our results indicate that having `1 norm constraints on the weight matrices
might be a potential way to improve generalization in the adversarial setting. Our experimental
results validate our theoretical findings.
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A Proof of Theorem 2
First, we have
RS(F) := 1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖w‖p≤W
n∑
i=1
σi〈w,xi〉
]
=
W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σixi
∥∥∥∥∥
q
 . (9)
We then analyze RS(F˜). Define f˜w(x, y) := minx′∈B∞x () y〈w,x′〉. Then, we have
f˜w(x, y) =
{
minx′∈B∞x ()〈w,x′〉 y = 1,
−maxx′∈B∞x ()〈w,x′〉 y = −1.
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When y = 1, we have
f˜w(x, y) = f˜w(x, 1) = min
x′∈B∞x ()
〈w,x′〉 = min
x′∈B∞x ()
d∑
i=1
wix
′
i
=
d∑
i=1
wi [1(wi ≥ 0)(xi − ) + 1(wi < 0)(xi + )] =
d∑
i=1
wi(xi − sgn(wi))
= 〈w,x〉 − ‖w‖1.
Similarly, when y = −1, we have
f˜w(x, y) = f˜w(x,−1) = − max
x′∈B∞x ()
〈w,x′〉 = − max
x′∈B∞x ()
d∑
i=1
wix
′
i
= −
d∑
i=1
wi [1(wi ≥ 0)(xi + ) + 1(wi < 0)(xi − )] = −
d∑
i=1
wi(xi + sgn(wi))
= −〈w,x〉 − ‖w‖1.
Thus, we conclude that f˜w(x, y) = y〈w,x〉 − ‖w‖1, and therefore
RS(F˜) = 1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖w‖2≤W
n∑
i=1
σi(yi〈w,xi〉 − ‖w‖1)
]
.
Define u :=
∑n
i=1 σiyixi and v := 
∑n
i=1 σi. Then we have
RS(F˜) = 1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖w‖p≤W
〈w,u〉 − v‖w‖1
]
Since the supremum of 〈w,u〉 − v‖w‖1 over w can only be achieved when sgn(wi) = sgn(ui), we
know that
RS(F˜) = 1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖w‖p≤W
〈w,u〉 − v〈w, sgn(w)〉
]
=
1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖w‖p≤W
〈w,u〉 − v〈w, sgn(u)〉
]
=
1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖w‖p≤W
〈w,u− v sgn(u)〉
]
=
W
n
Eσ [‖u− v sgn(u)‖q]
=
W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σiyixi −
(

n∑
i=1
σi
)
sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q
 . (10)
Now we prove an upper bound for RS(F˜). By triangle inequality, we have
RS(F˜) ≤W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σiyixi
∥∥∥∥∥
q
+ W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥(
n∑
i=1
σi) sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q

=RS(F) + W d
1
q
n
Eσ
[∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
σi
∣∣∣∣∣
]
≤RS(F) + W d
1
q√
n
,
where the last step is due to Khintchine’s inequality.
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We then proceed to prove a lower bound for RS(F˜). According to (10) and by symmetry, we
know that
RS(F˜) =W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
(−σi)yixi −
(

n∑
i=1
(−σi)
)
sgn(
n∑
i=1
(−σi)yixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q

=
W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σiyixi +
(

n∑
i=1
σi
)
sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q
 . (11)
Then, combining (10) and (11) and using triangle inequality, we have
RS(F˜) =W
2n
Eσ
[∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σiyixi −
(

n∑
i=1
σi
)
sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q
+
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σiyixi +
(

n∑
i=1
σi
)
sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q
]
≥W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σiyixi
∥∥∥∥∥
q
 = RS(F). (12)
Similarly, we have
RS(F˜) ≥W
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥(
n∑
i=1
σi
)
sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q

=
W
n
Eσ
 ∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
σi
∣∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥sgn(
n∑
i=1
σiyixi)
∥∥∥∥∥
q

=W
d
1
q
n
Eσ
[∣∣∣∣∣
n∑
i=1
σi
∣∣∣∣∣
]
.
By Khintchine’s inequality, we know that there exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
Eσ[|
∑n
i=1 σi|] ≥ c
√
n. Therefore, we have RS(F˜) ≥ cW d
1
q√
n
. Combining with (12), we complete
the proof.
B Multi-class Linear Classifiers
B.1 Proof of Theorem 3
According to the multi-class margin bound in [33], for any fixed γ, with probability at least 1− δ,
we have
P(x,y)∼D
{
y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[f(x)]y′
}
≤ 1
n
n∑
i=1
1([f(xi)]yi ≤ γ + max
y′ 6=y
[f(xi)]y′)
+
4K
γ
RS(Π1(F)) + 3
√
log 2δ
2n
,
where Π1(F) ⊆ RX is defined as
Π1(F) := {x 7→ [f(x)]k : f ∈ F , k ∈ [K]}.
In the special case of linear classifiers F = {fW(x) : ‖W>‖p,∞ ≤W}, we can see that
Π1(F) = {x 7→ 〈w,x〉 : ‖w‖p ≤W}.
Thus, we have
RS(Π1(F)) = 1
n
Eσ
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
i=1
σixi
∥∥∥∥∥
q
 ,
which completes the proof.
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B.2 Proof of Theorem 4
Since the loss function in the adversarial setting is
˜`(fW(x), y) = max
x′∈B∞x ()
φγ(M(fW(x), y)) = φγ( min
x′∈B∞x ()
M(fW(x), y)).
Since we consider linear classifiers, we have
min
x′∈B∞x ()
M(fW(x), y) = min
x′∈B∞x ()
min
y′ 6=y
(wy −wy′)>x′
= min
y′ 6=y
min
x′∈B∞x ()
(wy −wy′)>x′
= min
y′ 6=y
(wy −wy′)>x− ‖wy −wy′‖1 (13)
Define
h
(k)
W (x, y) := (wy −wk)>x− ‖wy −wk‖1 + γ1(y = k).
We now show that ˜`(fW(x), y) = max
k∈[K]
φγ(h
(k)
W (x, y)). (14)
To see this, we can see that according to (13),
min
x′∈B∞x ()
M(fW(x), y) = min
k 6=y
h
(k)
W (x, y).
If mink 6=y h
(k)
W (x, y) ≤ γ, we have mink 6=y h(k)W (x, y) = mink∈[K] h(k)W (x, y), since h(y)W (x, y) = γ.
On the other hand, if mink 6=y h
(k)
W (x, y) > γ, then mink∈[K] h
(k)
W (x, y) = γ. In this case, we have
φγ(mink 6=y h
(k)
W (x, y)) = φγ(mink∈[K] h
(k)
W (x, y)) = 0. Therefore, we can see that (14) holds.
Define the K function classes Fk := {h(k)W (x, y) : ‖W>‖p,∞ ≤W} ⊆ RX×Y . Since φγ(·) is 1/γ-
Lipschitz, according to the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality [35] and Lemma 8.1 in [41],
we have
RS(˜`F ) ≤ 1
γ
K∑
k=1
RS(Fk). (15)
We proceed to analyze RS(Fk). The basic idea is similar to the proof of Theorem 2. We define
uy =
∑n
i=1 σixi1(yi = y) and vy =
∑n
i=1 σi1(yi = y). Then, we have
RS(Fk) = 1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖W>‖p,∞≤W
n∑
i=1
σi((wyi −wk)>xi − ‖wyi −wk‖1 + γ1(yi = k))
]
=
1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖W>‖p,∞≤W
n∑
i=1
K∑
y=1
σi((wyi −wk)>xi − ‖wyi −wk‖1 + γ1(yi = k))1(yi = y)
]
=
1
n
Eσ
[
sup
‖W>‖p,∞≤W
K∑
y=1
n∑
i=1
σi((wy −wk)>xi1(yi = y)− ‖wy −wk‖11(yi = y)
+ γ1(yi = k)1(yi = y))
]
=
1
n
Eσ
[
γ
n∑
i=1
σi1(yi = k) + sup
‖W>‖p,∞≤W
∑
y 6=k
(〈wy −wk,uy〉 − vy‖wy −wk‖1)
]
≤ 1
n
Eσ
[∑
y 6=k
sup
‖wk‖p,‖wy‖p≤W
(〈wy −wk,uy〉 − vy‖wy −wk‖1)
]
=
1
n
Eσ
[∑
y 6=k
sup
‖w‖p≤2W
(〈w,uy〉 − vy‖w‖1)
]
=
2W
n
Eσ
[∑
y 6=k
‖uy − vy sgn(uy)‖q
]
,
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where the last equality is due to the same derivation as in the proof of Theorem 2. Let ny =∑n
i=1 1(yi = y). Then, we apply triangle inequality and Khintchine’s inequality and obtain
RS(Fk) ≤ 2W
n
∑
y 6=k
Eσ[‖uy‖2] + d 1q√ny.
Combining with (15), we obtain
RS(˜`F ) ≤ 2WK
γn
(
K∑
y=1
Eσ[‖uy‖2] + d 1q√ny) ≤ 2WK
γ
[

√
Kd
1
q√
n
+
1
n
K∑
y=1
Eσ[‖uy‖2]
]
,
where the last step is due to Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
C Neural Network
C.1 Proof of Theorem 6
We first review a Rademacher complexity lower bound in [9].
Lemma 2. [9] Define the function class
F̂ = {x 7→ fW(x) : W = (W1,W2, . . . ,WL),
L∏
h=1
‖Wh‖σ ≤ r},
and F̂ ′ = {x 7→ 〈w,x〉 : ‖w‖2 ≤ r2}. Then we have F̂ ′ ⊆ F̂ , and thus there exists a universal
constant c > 0 such that
RS(F̂) ≥ cr
n
‖X‖F .
According to Lemma 2, in the adversarial setting, by defining
F˜ ′ = {x 7→ min
x′∈B∞x ()
y〈w,x′〉 : ‖w‖2 ≤ r
2
} ⊆ RX×{−1,+1},
we have F˜ ′ ⊆ F˜ . Therefore, there exists a universal constant c > 0 such that
RS(F˜) ≥ RS(F˜ ′) ≥ cr
(
1
n
‖X‖F + 
√
d
n
)
,
where the last inequality is due to Theorem 2.
C.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Since Q(·, ·) is a linear function in its first argument, we have for any y, y′ ∈ [K],
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈Q(w2,y′ −w2,y,W1),P〉
≤ max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈Q(w2,y′ ,W1),P〉+ max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈−Q(w2,y,W1),P〉
≤2 max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉. (16)
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Then, for any (x, y), we have
max
x′∈B∞x ()
1(y 6= arg max
y′∈[K]
[fW(x
′)]y′)
≤φγ( min
x′∈B∞x ()
M(fW(x
′), y))
≤φγ(min
y′ 6=y
min
x′∈B∞x ()
[fW(x
′)]y − [fW(x′)]y′)
≤φγ
(
min
y′ 6=y
[fW(x)]y − [fW(x)]y′ − 
4
max
y′ 6=y
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈Q(w2,y′ −w2,y,W1),P〉
)
≤φγ
(
min
y′ 6=y
[fW(x)]y − [fW(x)]y′ − 
2
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
)
≤φγ
(
M(fW(x), y)− 
2
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
)
:= ̂`(fW(x), y)
≤1
(
M(fW(x), y)− 
2
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉 ≤ γ
)
,
where the first inequality is due to the property of ramp loss, the second inequality is by the
definition of the margin, the third inequality is due to Theorem 7, the fourth inequality is due
to (16), the fifth inequality is by the definition of the margin and the last inequality is due to the
property of ramp loss.
C.3 Proof of Theorem 8
We study the Rademacher complexity of the function class
̂`F := {(x, y) 7→ ̂`(fW(x), y) : fW ∈ F}.
Define MF := {(x, y) 7→M(fW(x), y) : fW ∈ F}. Then we have
RS(̂`F ) ≤ 1
γ
(
RS(MF ) +

2n
Eσ
[
sup
fW∈F
n∑
i=1
σi max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
])
, (17)
where we use the Ledoux-Talagrand contraction inequality and the convexity of the supreme oper-
ation. For the first term, since we have ‖W1‖1 ≤ b1, we have ‖W>1 ‖2,1 ≤ b1. Then, we can apply
the Rademacher complexity bound in [9] and obtain
RS(MF ) ≤ 4
n3/2
+
60 log(n) log(2dmax)
n
s1s2
(
(
b1
s1
)2/3 + (
b2
s2
)2/3
)3/2
‖X‖F . (18)
Now consider the second term in (17). According to [44], we always have
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉 ≥ 0. (19)
In addition, we know that when P  0 and diag(P) ≤ 1, we have
‖P‖∞ ≤ 1. (20)
Moreover, we have
‖W2‖∞ ≤ ‖W>2 ‖2,1 ≤ b2. (21)
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Then, we obtain

2n
Eσ
[
sup
fW∈F
n∑
i=1
σi max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
]
≤ 
2n
(
sup
fW∈F
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
)
Eσ
[
|
n∑
i=1
σi|
]
≤ 
2
√
n
sup
fW∈F
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
〈zQ(w2,k,W1),P〉
≤ 
2
√
n
sup
fW∈F
max
k∈[K],z=±1
max
P0,diag(P)≤1
‖zQ(w2,k,W1)‖1‖P‖∞
≤ 2√
n
sup
fW∈F
max
k∈[K]
‖ diag(w2,k)>W1‖1
≤ 2√
n
sup
fW∈F
‖W1‖1‖W2‖∞
≤2b1b2√
n
, (22)
where the first inequality is due to (19), the second inequality is due to Khintchine’s inequality, the
third inequality is due to Hölder’s inequality, and the fourth inequality is due to the definition of
Q(·, ·) and (20), the fifth inequality is a direct upper bound, and the last inequality is due to (21).
Now we can combine (18) and (22) and get an upper bound forRS(̂`F ) in (17). Then, Theorem 8
is a direct consequence of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
21
